![]() A continuous-build approach (one driven by a schedule designed to replace the first boat after around 30 years with no break in production) is appealing to Australian industry and current and future workers but would face many challenges-boats would be delivered on an inefficient three- or even four-year drumbeat, driving up cost and increasing the capability gap. The government has stated that the SSNs will be built in Adelaide however, it hasn’t committed to a continuous build. Every effort must be made to limit the changes, whether they’re motivated by capability or Australian industry content, as every change drives cost and schedule risk regardless of how well intentioned it is.Ī fundamental choice is the build strategy. While some modifications will be necessary due to Australia’s regulatory and safety regimes-unless we recognise our partner’s regulatory approaches as fit for purpose and accommodate ours to theirs-others will be discretionary. Do we prioritise schedule and build our partner’s current design, with the result that we’re left with an orphaned and outdated fleet? Do we wait to get into step with our partner’s next class, exacerbating the risk of a capability gap? Or do we start with the current design and transition later to the partner’s future design, with the result that we have multiple classes of boat in our small fleet?Īnother area of choice is the amount of modification we do to the design. While we shouldn’t pre-empt the work of the taskforce, initial analysis suggests that the US has more capacity to assist us.Įven once we choose a partner, we still have some difficult choices about the submarine design. While both the US and the UK will need to provide us with assistance regardless of which submarine design we choose, there’s no point picking a boat if its parent nation doesn’t have the capacity to assist us with all of the fundamental inputs to capability needed to deliver military effects, or its industrial base doesn’t have the capacity to deliver. The most important decision is the choice of our primary strategic partner. This report examines the decision space available to the government. Is it capability, schedule, Australian industry content, or something else? Those choices will involve hard prioritisation decisions about what’s most important. Second, Australia will need to make many choices-about the strategic partner, about the submarine design, about the build strategy, about schedule, and more. First, the most important decision isn’t so much about the submarine, but about the strategic partner most able to work with us on our new SSN capability. Many commentators have suggested that the work of the taskforce is primarily about making a recommendation on the choice of submarine-either the US Virginia class or the UK Astute class. ![]() It’s likely to be at least two decades and tens of billions of dollars in sunk costs before Australia has a useful nuclear-powered military capability. The challenges, costs and risks will be enormous. ![]() Nevertheless this new enterprise will be a massive undertaking and probably the largest and most complex endeavour Australia has embarked upon. The taskforce has its work cut out for it, and the signing of an initial nuclear information sharing agreement only two months after AUKUS was announced suggests things are moving fast. At the same time, it announced that it had established the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Taskforce, which would devote 18 months to determining the ‘optimal pathway’ to establishing this new capability. ![]() On 16 September 2021, the Australian Government announced that it would acquire a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) capability with support from the UK and the US as the first measure of business under the AUKUS technology sharing partnership.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |